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Abstract 
We describe a common but largely unrecognized mechanism that produces and exac-
erbates intergroup inequality: the diffusion of valuable practices with positive network 
externalities through social networks whose members differentially possess 
characteristics associated with adoption.  We examine two cases, the first to explicate the 
implications of the model, the second to demonstrate its utility in analyzing empirical 
data.  In the first, the diffusion of Internet use, network effects increase the utility of 
adoption to friends and relatives of prior adopters.  An agent-based model demonstrates 
positive, monotonic relationships, given externalities, between homophily bias and inter-
group inequality in equilibrium adoption rates.  In the second, rural/urban migration in 
Thailand, network effects reduce risk to persons whose networks include prior migrants.  
Using longitudinal individual-level migration data, we find that network homophily in-
teracts with network externalities to induce inequality in migration rates among otherwise 
similar villages.   
 
Introduction 
We introduce a class of social mechanisms that influence intergroup inequality, usually 
by making such inequality larger and more durable, although potentially effacing 
inequality as well.   These mechanisms come into play when (a) a good, service, or 
practice influences individual life chances; (b) that good, service or practice is charact-
erized by network externalities, such that the benefits to adopters are higher, or the risks 
are lower, if persons to whom adopters have social ties have already adopted; and (c) 
actors’ social networks are differentiated with respect to some characteristic associated 
with adoption.   We illustrate our argument with case studies of two very different 
practices --- technology adoption in the U.S. and internal migration in Thailand – to 
suggest the scope within which we believe these mechanisms operate.  The first case 
employs a computational model to explicate the implications of the argument.  The 
second illustrates the argument’s utility in addressing empirical puzzles. 
  This project emerged from our respective efforts to solve concrete empirical 
problems --- whether intergroup differences in Internet adoption would persist;  and why 
similar Thai villages diverged over time in rates of rural-urban migration.  These two 
empirical questions, we came to realize, entail analytically similar social mechanisms.  In 
each case individual choices (to use the Internet or to migrate) are influenced by prior 
choices by members of ego’s social network; and intergroup inequality (in technology Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---2--- 
use or in rates of migration) is amplified to the extent that ego’s social network is homo-
philous with respect to socioeconomic status.
 2    
   Our approach is  consistent with the view that sociological explanation can be 
advanced by identifyng “social mechanisms” that entail (a) goal-directed individual 
actions and (b) consequent social interactions that (c) yield higher-level outcomes that (i) 
are emergent (i.e., that cannot be recovered simply by aggregating individual actions that 
combine to produce them) and that (ii) vary depending upon the initial social structure 
(ordinarily depicted in terms of social networks) (Hedstrom 2005; Tilly 2006).   Despite 
this perspective’s growing prominence, it has played a relatively minor role in empirical 
research on social inequality.  Such research has often treated inequality as the aggregate 
product of individual efforts to obtain useful educations, good jobs, and adequate 
incomes, positing that people with similar initial endowments have similar experiences 
that lead them to similar outcomes.  Efforts to incorporate actors’ structural locations 
(position in networks or in the labor market) into such models ordinarily convert social 
structure into individual-level variables in income-determination models (Lin, Ensel and 
Vaughn 1981; Baron and Bielby 1980).    
  By contrast, we focus on the production of system-level inequality as a 
consequence of individual choice under varying structural conditions.   Simon (1957) 
introduced the idea that inequality reflects the depth of organizational hierarchies (itself a 
function of organization size and span of control).  White (1970) explored the impact of 
vacancy rates on emergent properties of systems of inequality.  Boudon (1973; Breen and 
                                                 
2 We recognize that other less common mechanisms (e.g. heterophilous preference for alters with high-
status characteristics one does not possess in populations with weakly or negatively correlated status 
parameters) could also combine with externalities to generate inequality.  Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---3--- 
Goldthorpe 1997) developed a competitive model of individual investments in schooling 
to explain why intergroup inequality persisted in the face of educational expansion.   
Western, Bloome and Percheski (2008) explored the impact of family structure and 
homogamy on income inequality.  In this paper, we develop a model of inequality 
generation that draws on elements from three social-science literatures: on network 
externalities; on innovation diffusion under conditions of interdependent choice; and on 
homophily in social networks.      
Network Externalities, Diffusion Models, and Social Homophily 
In 1892, John F. Parkinson, an entrepreneur who sold hardware and lumber, became the 
first telephone subscriber in Palo Alto, California.  (This account is from Fischer 1992: 
130-34.)  Parkinson placed the phone in his business.  A line to the Menlo Park telephone 
exchange a few miles away connected him to other Bay Area firms.   By 1893, a realtor 
and a butcher had joined him and soon a local pharmacy took a subscription, placing its 
phone in a quiet room where customers could use it for a fee.   By 1897, Palo Alto had 
nineteen telephone subscribers, including several – Parkinson, two physicians and two 
newspaper editors – with telephones in their homes.    
  It is no accident that early subscribers were businessmen and professionals for 
whom the telephone was a means of staying in contact with suppliers, customers, and cli-
ents.   Why get a phone for social reasons unless you could call your family and friends?  
Indeed, many years would pass before telephone companies recognized the telephone’s 
potential as an instrument of sociability (Fischer 1992: chapter 3).   Not until 1920 did 
subscription rates approach 50 percent even in prosperous Palo Alto (ibid.: 141).  
Naturally, telephones were more common in professional and business households, Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---4--- 
whose members were more likely to have friends and relatives with telephone service.  
By 1930, blue-collar households caught up in Palo Alto, where many blue-collar workers 
were independent tradesmen whose clients had phones, but not in neighboring towns 
where most blue-collar residents worked in factories (ibid. 146-47).  
  Even after telephone service took off, inequality was tenacious.  The United 
States did not approach 90 percent household penetration until 1970.  As late as 1990, the 
poorest Americans often lacked service, which was close to universal at incomes of 
$20,000 or more (in 1990 dollars) but declined precipitously below that.
3   Race and 
ethnicity had independent effects on telephone service even controlling for income 
(Schement 1995).  Something other than cost – perhaps interaction effects related to 
network composition --  must have driven these differences.   
Tangible networks are not the only ones that exhibit positive externalities. The 
basic mechanism applies to purely social networks too.   Consider the problem of 
socioeconomic and racial inequality in advanced-placement (AP) course enrollments in 
U.S. high schools (Kao and Thompson 2003; Klopfenstein 2004). Imagine a class with 
three hundred students, divided into three hierarchically arrayed SES tiers.   Each student 
must decide whether to take an AP course.  Each knows that AP courses will help gain 
admission to selective colleges and may reduce the time it takes to earn a college degree.   
Each also knows that to take advantage of this benefit, he or she will have to invest a lot 
of time in learning enough to pass the AP exam.   
                                                 
3After 1990, many Americans, including young, affluent ones, substituted cell phone service for land lines.  
In 2000, household penetration declined for the first time since the Depression, but apparently as a result of 
cell-phone substitution, not a decline in telephone access.  Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---5--- 
Several factors influence students’ decisions: whether they expect to attend 
college, whether they qualify for admission to AP courses, whether team sports or after-
school work pose competing demands, and so on.    Based only on such considerations, 
imagine that the probability of choosing to enroll in an AP course is 80 percent in the top 
tier, 50 percent in the middle tier, and 20 percent at the bottom.   
  Now, consider the network externalities associated with taking AP courses.  If 
your friends take the course too, you can study together, collaborate on homework, share 
a scientific calculator, or use a friend’s high-speed Internet connection to prepare 
presentations.  Such considerations increase the benefit of taking the course (you will 
learn more and enjoy socializing), reduce the rate at which you discount expected 
benefits (you will be more likely to pass the AP exam), and reduce your financial and 
temporal costs.   
  If friendships were distributed randomly – if a top-tier kid were as likely to have a 
bottom-tier friend as one in his or her own group – then, on average, half of each stud-
ent’s friends would plan to take an AP course.  If kids in each tier had the same number 
of friends and effects were additive, more students would take AP courses than if decis-
ions were made in isolation.  And because lower-tier kids would know as many AP-
course-takers as upper-tier kids, the outcome might be more equal than if choices did not 
interact.   
  In real high schools, however, friendships are never randomly distributed.  
Friendships are homophilous: similar kids hang out with one another more than with kids 
from other groups (Currarini, Jackson and Pin 2010; Quillian and Campbell 2003).   If we 
build homophily into our example, externalities may exacerbate inequality, not reduce it.  Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---6--- 
Most positive effects from mutual influence will accrue to students in the top tier, 
because their friends disproportionately enroll in AP courses.  Because bottom-tier kids 
have only a few friends in AP courses, externalities benefit them less.  Combine these 
influences – big effects on advantaged students’ choices, small ones on those of the 
disadvantaged – and initial gaps increase.  
           The point of these examples is to convey the intuitions behind and suggest the 
scope of applicability of models we describe more systematically below.  Each example 
has three elements: a choice (purchasing telephone service, signing up for an AP test); 
positive network externalities (your telephone is more valuable if you can call your 
friends with it; you get more out of AP courses with less effort if your friends take them, 
too); and social homophily (which makes positive externalities redound more decisively 
to groups that possess an initial advantage).   Combine these three elements – choice, 
externalities, and homophily (or, more generally, networks differentiated by factors 
associated with adoption) –in a diffusion process and the result often exacerbates social 
inequality by reinforcing pre-existing forms of privilege through differential adoption of 
a new product or practice. Below, we examine these elements more closely and discuss 
work that has informed our perspective. 
Network Externalities 
A product, service, or behavior possesses network externalities insofar as its value to an 
actor depends upon the number of other actors who consume the product or service or 
engage in the practice.  The term derives from work in economics of communication and 
innovation, which has focused on a network’s aggregate value  as a nonlinear function of 
scale (and the difficulty of internalizing that value) (Katz and Shapiro 1985; Arthur 1989; Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---7--- 
Shy 2001).  By contrast, we focus on network effects from the standpoint of individual 
decision makers (to whom the value of action increases with network size).   DiMaggio 
and Cohen (2004) distinguish between general network externalities (when each user’s 
benefit from adoption is influenced only by the number, and not by the identities, of other 
adopters) and identity-specific network externalities (where each user’s benefit is a funct-
ion of the identities of those who adopt).   Specific externalities may be status-based 
(e.g., positive when users are higher-status than oneself and negative when they are 
lower-status) or network-based (when perceived benefit is a function of the number or 
percentage of members of one’s own network who have already adopted).   Whereas 
economists ordinarily emphasize general network externalities, we are primarily 
concerned with specific externalities, because of their implications for social inequality.  
Thus in order to adapt the notion of network externalities to the study of social inequality, 
we narrow it by focusing upon identity-specific externalities but broaden it by applying it 
to practices as well as goods and services. 
  Networks are endemic to communications technologies and utilities: telephones, 
fax machines, e-mail clients, instant messaging, and social media like Facebook or 
Twitter.  But as our AP-course example suggests, we believe that network externalities 
characterize a much broader range of choices: between public, secular private, and re-
ligious secondary schools (kids like to go to the same schools as their friends and parents 
benefit from car-pooling and information-sharing); fertility (raising children is easier if 
your friends have kids [or if you make friends with people who do]) (Buhler and Fratczak 
2007); divorce (the more divorces in one’s social network, the more people are available Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---8--- 
for support and companionship and the larger the pool of potential mates) (Booth, 
Edwards and Johnson 1991); and health-related behaviors (Christakis and Fowler 2008).  
Social Homophily      
Social networks are homophilous with respect to a trait to the extent that connected pairs 
of actors share that characteristic.
4   Since Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954) coined the term, 
studies in many societies and organizations have demonstrated pervasive homophily with 
respect to race and ethnicity, gender, age, educational attainment, religion, and other 
factors (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001).    
  Rogers (2003:307) depicts homophily as a barrier to diffusion, arguing that where 
homophily is strong, adoption of innovations is more likely to be limited to elites.  
Several authors note a relationship between homophily and inequality in educational or 
occupational attainment, but have not placed this relationship in the context of an explicit 
model of diffusion or behavioral change.  Buhai and van der Leij (2008) model 
occupational segregation as a result of social homophily combined with network effects 
on access to jobs.  Quillian (2006) argues that racially homogeneous friendship networks 
reduce the academic achievement of capable Black students relative to that of equally 
able white peers.  From the group perspective, homophily facilitates sustaining 
monopolies over scarce resources (Tilly 1999).  From an individual perspective, however, 
it is precisely heterophilous ties (especially to persons of higher status) that enhance 
mobility (Granovetter 1973; Lin, Ensel and Vaughn 1981).    
                                                 
4  We use “ homophily” to refer to the tendency for networks to consist of persons similar in status for 
whatever reason, purposely conflating structural, choice, and inbreeding homophily because we focus on 
homophily’s effects and do not model its causes.   Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---9--- 
  We apply these insights to the system level to contend that homophily tends to 
increase intergroup inequality, whereas heterophily tends to reduce it. We argue that the 
interaction between network externalities and social homophily is a critical mechanism 
for the production of social inequality in access to novel goods and engagement in 
innovative practices. To the extent that adoption of such goods and practices contributes 
to individual success and well-being, this mechanism  increases intergroup social 
inequality.    
Models of Diffusion 
In order to understand the implications of research on externalities and homophily for 
macro-level intergroup inequality, we must specify the mechanisms by which individual 
choices interact.  The most useful instruments to this end are threshold models of 
diffusion.  Threshold models constitute a subset of contagion models  that emphasize the 
distribution of adoption thresholds, often depicted as a function of individual attributes 
and network characteristics, within an at-risk population.
 5  An early exposition of ideas 
influencing such models appears in Liebenstein’s (1950)   essay on interdependence in 
consumer demand.  He distinguished between positive and negative externalities,  which 
he termed, respectively, “bandwagon” effects and “snob” effects; and between cases in 
which ego’s demand is a function of aggregate consumption and those in which some 
consumers influence ego’s decisions more than others.   Leibenstein recognized that his 
analysis was limited by his reliance upon comparative statics, the assumption that “the 
                                                 
5 We do not presume that choices are “rational” either phenomenologically or in effect.  People may adopt 
courses of action unreflectively; or they may adopt them on the basis of poor information about costs, 
benefits, and risks.   Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---10--- 
order of events is of no significance” (ibid.: 187).   Progress came through relaxing this 
assumption.   
  Coleman, Katz and Menzel (1957) introduced dynamic models based on network-
driven interdependence in their study of physicians’ adoption of tetracycline.  They found 
that adoption was brisker and penetration greater among physicians with many ties to 
other doctors than among less connected practitioners.   This difference, they argued, 
reflected choice interdependence among the well-connected, inducing a “snowball” or 
“chain-reaction” pattern as use of the new drug spread.  
  Building on Schelling’s (1971) work on residential segregation, Granovetter 
(1978) produced a significant advance towards the class of models employed here.   His 
models applied to situations in which (a) agents must make a binary choice over a 
number of successive time points; (b) “The costs and benefits to the actor … depend in 
part on how many others make which choice” (1422); (c) each agent has a threshold at 
which she or he will choose to act; (d) agents respond more directly to actions of personal 
contacts than to those of strangers; and (e) outcomes (the proportion of agents choosing 
to act and, especially, whether this proportion reaches the critical mass necessary to 
sustain some collective behavior) depend upon the distribution of thresholds, not just the 
mean.  Granovetter assembled all the parts necessary for the models developed here, with 
two exceptions: thresholds are exogenous and actors vary only in thresholds and network 
position.
6  
                                                 
6 Different mechanisms may account for similar forms of diffusion (Van den Bulte and Lilien 2001).  Van 
den Bulte and Stremersch (ibid.) and Rossman, Chiu and Mol (2006) introduce innovative ways to use 
information on multiple innovations to distinguish among varying mechanisms. Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---11--- 
  We draw on this work, but diverge from many models by treating externalities as 
specific, in most conditions based on decisions by members of one’s own social network 
and not by the number of adopters in general.  Moreover, we innovate by adding status 
homophily as a key variable and by focusing on group-specific diffusion rates (and their 
implications for social inequality), rather than on rates for the population as a whole.    
We combine insights from work on network effects, social homophily, and 
threshold models to argue that diffusion of goods and practices with strong, identity-
specific network externalities through status-homogeneous networks tends to exacerbate 
social inequality.  To do so, we present two cases.  First, we explicate our argument using 
an agent-based model to predict group-specific diffusion paths for Internet use, varying 
the type of network effect and the extent of homophily.  Second, we demonstrate the 
argument’s empirical utility through an analysis of variation in rates of rural-urban 
migration in Thailand, to test the hypothesis that differences in status homophily among 
otherwise similar villages combined over time with network externalities to generate 
divergent migration patterns from small initial differences.   
 
Table 1 here 
________________________________________________________________________ 
These cases are very different (Table 1).  Internet diffusion is a conventional 
instance of new-product adoption where network effects directly enhance the 
technology’s value (i.e., the value of the network to which the technology provides 
access) to the agent.   Rural-urban migration is a longstanding practice that became much 
more widespread in Thailand during the 1980s. Network effects are indirect, in that 
connections to prior adopters are not themselves the source of value, but rather provide Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---12--- 
information that increases returns to and reduces risks associated with migration.  In the 
Internet case we track intergroup inequality based on educational attainment, income and 
race.  In the migration case, we explain inequality in migration rates among villages.   
Nonetheless, the two cases share the requisite characteristics for the model to apply: 
network effects and interdependent choice; status homophily within networks; and 
sequential choice by numerous agents.  
      
Case 1: The Internet: Transitional Inequality or Permanent Divide? 
To understand network effects in the emergence of intergroup inequality in access to and 
use of the Internet, we employ agent-based models (Macy and Willer 2002).  Agent-
based modeling is particularly useful when theory-based predictions of individual choices 
are available but global results of interactions among choices are not readily apprehended 
through intuition or amenable to formal mathematical analysis, and when detailed 
longitudinal micro-data are unavailable.   Such models enable us to explore the systems 
implications of behavioral mechanisms and the robustness of those mechanisms to 
changes in the values of key parameters.   Agent-based modeling entails a tension 
between realism and generalizability.  We base as many parameters as possible on 
available data, while varying two theoretically central variables as, in effect, experimental 
conditions.   The purpose is not to simulate Internet diffusion (which would require more 
complex models) but to understand macro-patterns produced by particular micro 
processes.  
The Problem Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---13--- 
We begin with an empirical puzzle.  Early in the Internet era, many believed that, by 
making useful information accessible at low cost, the Internet would enhance inform-
ational, and thus social, equality (Cairncross 1997).   Others warned that the Internet 
could exacerbate inequality, because the wealthy and highly educated had resources that 
enabled them to employ the Internet more extensively and productively than their lower-
status peers, thus widening the “knowledge gap” (and the gap in rewards that knowledge 
brings) observed for other media (Bonfadelli 2002).  
          When, after a decade of commercial availability, Internet use remained more com-
mon among Americans with college degrees and relatively high incomes than among the 
less educated and the poor, many concluded that such inequality (the “digital divide”)  
was an enduring problem.  Critics of this view, however, pointed out that intergroup ineq-
uality in adoption rates occurs whenever groups start at different baselines or reach 
critical mass at different times (Leigh and Atkinson 2001).     
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 1 here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Consider the top panel of Figure 1, which depicts stylized adoption curves for two 
populations, A and B, with differences measured at three points in time (x, y, and z).  The 
x axis represents time and the y axis represents the percentage of adopters.  Group B 
begins the adoption process later than and reaches takeoff after group A.   If we compare 
early rates (time x), we see no inequality.  Because A reaches takeoff before B, we then 
see increasing inequality, reaching a maximum at y, just before B reaches takeoff and just 
as A approaches equilibrium.  Trend analysis between y and z, by contrast, shows 
declining inequality and (correctly) predicts convergence.   Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---14--- 
  The bottom panel of Figure 1 presents a similar depiction of the adoption history 
of two other populations.  Group C’s trajectory is identical to that of Group A in the top 
panel.  Group D gets into the game at the same point as group B (top), but adopts more 
slowly and plateaus at a lower level of penetration.  As in the previous case, inequality 
peaks at point y.  But it remains high even at point z.  In this case, a pessimistic 
conclusion based on measurement at points x and y (intergroup inequality is a real 
problem) is more accurate than an optimistic prediction based on measurement at points y 
and z.   The problem is this: At point x we cannot know if we are in the top or the bottom 
panel of Figure 1– i.e., whether intergroup inequality will increase or decline – unless we 
understand the mechanisms driving diffusion.   
  How might we tell?  One can examine trends in inequality by comparing penetrat-
ion rates for different groups over this span (Fig.2).  Data on Internet use have been 
collected by the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1997 to 2007.
7   We focus on 
Internet use at home, rather than at work, school, or elsewhere, because home use ordin-
arily provides the greatest autonomy and opportunities for learning (DiMaggio, Hargittai, 
Celeste and Shafer 2004).  Moreover, Internet use at home is consequential, boosting 
earnings net of technology use at work (DiMaggio and Bonikowski 2008).  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Figure 2 here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                                 
7 Between 1997 and 2003, the items were sponsored by the National Telecommunications and Information 
Agency, the federal agency responsible for implementing congressionally mandated universal 
telecommunications service. The 2007 items were asked as part of a module on school enrollment. Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---15--- 
Using odds ratios (Fig. 2) as a measure, we see that some types of inequality 
declined between 1997 and 2007.
8  Men’s advantage over women was much greater 
before 2000 than thereafter.  Some movement towards greater equality occurred between 
non-Hispanic whites and, respectively, African Americans and Hispanics; and between 
the elderly and those in younger cohorts.   By contrast, college graduates’ advantage over 
high school graduates without college persisted throughout this period.   
Similarly, analysis of successive cross-sections with statistical controls demonstrated 
declining net effects on adoption of gender and metropolitan (as compared to rural) 
residence, but persistent effects of education and income (DiMaggio and Cohen 2004).      
Such studies cannot tell us if the digital divide is a permanent or transitional problem, 
however.  For that we need a theoretical account of mechanisms that generate intergroup 
inequality in technology use.   We build upon such an account with an agent-based model 
that highlights one critical mechanism: choice interdependence influenced by network 
externalities under conditions of homophily.  
The Model 
Our model produces seven artificial worlds (i.e., experimental conditions), each 
populated by 2,257 heterogeneous agents.   The worlds vary in (a) the presence and type 
of network externality and (b) the degree of homophily.  We use them to explore how 
inequality in Internet use between groups based on race (African-American or white), 
income, and education varies over time as a function of the presence and type of network 
effect (none, general, or identity-specific) and as a function of the strength of pressures 
                                                 
8 By “odds ratio” we refer to the ratio of the odds of adoption of the first group to the odds of adoption for 
the second group: (p1/1-p1)/(p2/1-p2).  Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---16--- 
towards homophily (i.e., homophily bias).   To ensure that the distribution of parameters 
and associations among parameters are realistic, we base our agents upon 2257 African-
American and white respondents to the 2002 General Social Survey, which included 
items on network size, race, education, and income.
9 
Each agent is assigned a reservation price – an adoption threshold at which it will 
purchase Internet service.  At the end of each period (roughly equivalent to one month), 
each agent compares the price of Internet service to its reservation price, and either 
adopts or declines to adopt.  Agents may adopt because economies of scale drive prices to 
or below their reservation price; because more members of their networks adopt (raising 
their reservation price); or due to a combination of both.  After each period, the 
cumulative percentage of agents with different races, income levels, and educational 
degrees who have adopted is reported and added to a graph that records 100 periods.  Our 
analysis focuses on the impact of two variables – the nature and extent of network 
externalities and the degree of homophily -- on the extent of intergroup inequality in 
adoption throughout the diffusion process. 
We explicate model details in Appendix A (available online).   Two points are 
critical: (1) adoption is driven by the relationship between the cost of Internet service and 
                                                 
9 Respondents were first asked “Not counting people at work or family at home, about how many other 
friends, or relatives do you keep in contact with at least once a year?” We use the network size measure 
generated by the follow-up to this question: “Of these friends and relatives, about how many would you say 
you feel really close to, that is close enough to discuss personal or important problems with?”  GSS reports 
income as a series of ranges: We treat income as uniformly distributed within each interval and randomly 
assign individuals to points in their distributions. Individuals who reported family incomes of $110K or 
more (about 10 percent) were randomly allocated to incomes up to $650,000 based on CPS data on actual 
income distributions in that range. (CPS is top-coded at $250K, but the mean income in the top-income 
category is reported to be $450K. We assume the range in the top category to be [$250K, $650K], 
producing a mean of $450K if income is uniformly distributed.) Race is either White or Black and 
education is measured in years. 
 Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---17--- 
each agent’s reservation price (i.e., what the agent will pay) and (2) this relationship 
varies across experimental conditions.  Absent externalities, reservation prices are a 
function of income and remain constant; therefore only reductions in cost can induce 
adoption.   In the general-externalities condition, reservation prices are affected both by 
income and by change in response to the percentage of agents who have already adopted.  
In this condition, new adopters affect all at-risk agents in the same way (although 
susceptibility to this influence rises with income).   In the five conditions characterized 
by identity-specific externalities, reservation prices are influenced by income and by the 
percentage of the members of ego’s personal network who have already adopted.  Each 
additional adoption increases the reservation price for agents linked to the adopter and for 
no one else.   Five conditions with identity-specific externalities vary in the extent to 
which network composition is biased towards homophily (Skvoretz 1990), ranging from 
no homophily bias (i.e., network partners selected at random from the population) 
through maximal homophily (all network partners chosen from a pool of those most 
similar to ego based on a composite measure of similarity in education, income, and race, 
with weights based on results from McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Brashears [2006]).
10   
Results 
We argue that individual choices affect the reservation prices of others.  In conditions 
with identity-specific externalities, adoption cascades through micro-networks, retarded 
by poverty (people without much money have lower reservation prices) and either 
                                                 
10 The authors produced an Errata when GSS reported miscoding 41 responses, but the differences are 
small and immaterial for our purposes. Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---18--- 
retarded or accelerated by homogeneity within ego networks.   This intuition leaves open 
questions about how local adoption pressures lead to global intergroup inequality.  To 
what extent do externalities accelerate adoption rates for groups with initial advantages?  
To what extent does homophily retard adoption among less well endowed agents?  What 
level of homophily is required to have an effect?  The models enable us to address such 
questions. 
           We follow the adoption paths of 2,257 agents for 100 time-periods under seven 
scenarios (1) no network externalities, (2) general network externalities, (3) identity-
specific network externalities and no homophily (h=0) (random nets), and  (4-7) identity-
specific externalities with homophily bias set, respectively, to h=0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1.0.  
For each condition, we undertake 1000 simulation trials, reporting the mean values for 
each time period.   
       The analysis includes four steps:  First, we look at the impact of the seven conditions 
on overall diffusion trajectories, for the sample as a whole and for groups within it, focus-
ing on the rapidity of takeoff (i.e., the slope) and on equilibrium adoption rates.   Second, 
we examine variation among the seven conditions in inequality between pairs of groups 
defined on the basis of race, education, and income.  Third, we undertake logistic regress-
ions predicting adoption at each period to examine the net impact of race, education and 
income on individual choices throughout the process.  Fourth, we use regression analysis 
of 7000 trials to describe how externalities and homophily interact to affect group-level 
rates and intergroup inequality. 
  Overall adoption rates.   Absent externalities, Internet adoption never reaches 
critical mass: prices decline and adoption proceeds glacially, with only 10 percent Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---19--- 
penetration after 100 periods (Fig. 3).  Adoption rates in other conditions resemble a 
conventional sigmoid curve, rising slowly, then sharply, and eventually leveling off.   
Adoption under general externalities (i.e. when reservation prices decline as the proport-
ion of adopters in the population increases) takes off between periods 30 and 40, rising 
sharply to the highest adoption level of any condition, nearly 65 percent at equilibrium.   
Introducing specific externalities without homophily scatters the effects of new adoptions 
throughout the population, rather than applying them to everyone as for general extern-
alities.  As a result, some agents are marooned in non-adopting networks, with adoption 
slower (the takeoff begins after period 40) and lower at equilibrium.   
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 3 here 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Combining network externalities with homophily induces more rapid takeoffs, 
but lower penetration overall.   When homophily is modest (h=0.25) the trajectory is 
similar to that for the general-externalities condition through period 55, then plateaus 
more quickly.   Strong homophily (h=1.0) stimulates early adoption sharply, as adoption 
cascades among homogeneous networks, inducing takeoff around period 20.  It limits the 
reach of network effects, however, producing an equilibrium adoption level below that of 
any other condition with externalities.  Middling homophily levels (h=0.50 and h=0.75) 
yield middling results.   The rule, then, is that the stronger the bias towards homophily in 
a process driven by identify-specific externalities, the steeper the slope and the lower the 
equilibrium penetration rate (shown in the inset figure in the lower right), with 
differences in penetration across h small but monotonic.    Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---20--- 
  Forms and Degrees of Inequality.  We begin with inequality in rates of Internet 
adoption by income and then address inequality based on education and on race.  We 
divide agents into three equal-sized income classes, high (>$55,000), medium ($30,000-
$54,999), and low (<$30,000).  Because the model includes a direct income effect and 
(where applicable) interactions between income and network effects, income has a very 
strong influence on adoption.   In analyses available upon request, the top income class 
has an equilibrium adoption rate of more than 90 percent in all conditions with extern-
alities, with the highest rates associated with the highest level of homophily.  Rates for 
the middle class range from 63 to 70 percent, with rates highest for general externalities 
and descending as homophily bias increases.  Equilibrium rates for the lowest income 
class decline from 26 percent with general network effects and 23 percent with identity-
specific externalities but random networks (no homophily) to just 18 percent with 
specific externalities and complete homophily.  In other words, given identity-specific 
network externalities, homophily increases adoption among the most prosperous and 
suppresses adoption among the least privileged.  
Figure 4 depicts the ratio of the odds of adoption for the highest to the odds for 
the lowest income group over the course of diffusion.   Differences are sharpest when 
identity-specific externalities combine with maximum homophily bias (an odds ratio at 
equilibrium of almost 100:1); in that condition, just after period 20, when all of the high-
income agents have adopted but hardly any of the low-income agents have done so, the 
odds ratio reaches 300:1, dropping as low-income adoption increases, and leveling off at 
period 40.   
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 4 here Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---21--- 
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Given identity-specific externalities, increments in homophily enhance the slope 
and the equilibrium rate of adoption for the highest-income group and increase that 
group’s advantage at equilibrium over the lowest-income tertile.  All effects are mon-
otonically related to homophily bias: The more homophily, the more rapidly inequality 
increases, the higher the rate at which it peaks, the greater the gap between the peak and 
the equilibrium level, and the higher is inequality at equilibrium.   Inequality in the 
general-externalities condition is similar to that at moderate levels of homophily bias 
(h=0.5), but the peak and variance are considerably smaller.  It follows that estimates of 
intergroup inequality early in a diffusion process are often poor indicators of long-term 
differences.   
Educational inequality.  There are four education subgroups:  Agents with college 
degrees or more; agents with some college who did not graduate; high school graduates 
who did not attend college; and high–school non-completers.  Unlike income, education 
has no direct effect upon reservation price; by design, its sole influence comes from the 
correlation of education with income.   Therefore inequality among different education 
levels is less extreme than among income levels.  In the general-externalities condition 
(where penetration is greatest), equilibrium rates are just over 80 percent for college 
graduates, almost as high for agents with some college, 61 percent for high school 
graduates without college, and 42 percent for agents lacking high school degrees (graphs 
available upon request).    Unlike the case for income, general externalities are associated 
with relatively low equilibrium levels of inequality, slightly below that observed with 
random networks under the identity-specific externalities condition.   Otherwise, the Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---22--- 
results for income and education are very similar:  the greater the tendency toward 
homophily, the steeper the slope of odds ratios between education levels, the more 
marked the difference in equilibrium rates by class, and the greater the difference 
between peak and equilibrium inequality (Fig. 5).          
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 5 here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Racial inequality.  The system has two races, Blacks and Whites.  Race does not 
affect agents’ reservation prices directly, but is associated with them through its correlat-
ion with income.   Income is lower for Blacks than for Whites.  Equilibrium diffusion for 
whites (graphs available upon request) is highest (68 percent) under general externalities, 
but very similar (63-65 percent) under all specific-externality conditions.   Equilibrium 
adoption rates for Blacks, although lower in all conditions, are, as for whites, highest (50 
percent) under general externalities.  In contrast to whites’ rates, however, rates for 
Blacks decline monotonically with homophily under identity-specific externalities, from 
44 percent with random nets to 39 percent when homophily bias is at its maximum.   
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 6 here 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Racial inequality, measured as an odds ratio, is lowest (about 2.3:1) under general 
externalities (Fig. 6).  As with other forms of inequality, under specific-externality 
conditions the slope of inequality, peak inequality, equilibrium inequality, and the Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---23--- 
difference between peak and equilibrium inequality all increase monotonically as 
homophily bias increases.
11   
Net Effects of Income, Race, and Education.  Thus far we have compared diffus-
ion trajectories and estimated intergroup inequality separately for groups based on each 
individual attribute.   Here we report results of analyses using repeated cross-sectional 
regressions to plot net effects of income, race, and education on adoption over time, 
under different conditions.
12  
  Logistic regressions were run to predict individual-level adoption under each of 
the seven conditions (with results for each period averaged across 25 trials per condition) 
from periods 10 through 80 (Figs. 7-9).
13 We focus on the relative magnitude of these 
estimates across conditions.  A unit increase in logged income -- for example, an increase 
from $20,000 to $54,364 -- raises the equilibrium odds of adoption between 80 percent 
(given specific externalities and a random network) to 120 percent (with specific 
externalities and maximum homophily bias).  Each extra year of education increases the 
odds of adoption at equilibrium by from 1 percent (general externalities) to 7 percent 
(specific externalities with maximum homophily bias) in Figure 8.  Being White 
increases odds of adoption by 11 percent (general externalities) to 50 percent (specific 
externalities with maximum homophily) compared to being Black.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                                 
11 Networks generated by our model are less racially segregated than those reported in the General Social 
Survey because, as noted above, we used a composite social-distance measure to generate the networks 
characterized by homophily.   
12 Separate models were run with an added control for network size, but this did not materially affect the 
results. 
13 Twenty-five trials were used (after exploratory analyses established their results did not vary from those 
using larger numbers of trials) due to computational time and capacity constraints.  Results were averaged 
only through period 80 because the models reached equilibrium by that point. Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---24--- 
Figures 7, 8 and 9 here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Inspecting differences among conditions reinforces inferences from descriptive 
results presented earlier.  Under the identity-specific–externality conditions, net effects of 
income, education and race all increase monotonically with homophily bias, providing 
further evidence that identity-specific externalities and homophily interact to exacerbate 
intergroup inequality.   Under general externalities, net effects of race and education are 
essentially null and income effects are moderate, comparable to their impact at the 
median of homophily bias.  Education effects gather strength over the course of the 
diffusion process, especially at low levels of homophily.  By contrast, especially at high 
levels of homophily bias, race and income effects weaken over time.  
  We also modeled adoption at equilibrium with interaction effects (table available 
upon request).
14   As before (and necessarily given the design of the model), income is 
highly significant in every condition, and becomes more so as homophily increases.   In 
models without interactions, race and education reach statistical significance only in 
conditions with identity-specific externalities; the effects of race peak when h=0.75 and 
of education when h=1.0.  Thus the combination of specific externalities and homophily 
induces net increases in inequality based on variables merely correlated with income, 
even though the model does not specify a direct effect of these on adoption choices; and 
the effect strengthens as homophily increases.   Positive interactions between being white 
and income and between education and income in most conditions with identity-specific 
                                                 
14 In order to calculate standard errors, we did not average across 25 runs (as we did for the coefficients 
plotted in Fig. 10), but used results from the implementation of each model with the median coefficient for 
education (as those coefficients were the most variable across runs).   Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---25--- 
externalities suggest that such network effects not only exacerbate each form of 
intergroup inequality, but also compound effects of different advantages.  
 Statistical impact of externalities and homophily on inequality.  Finally, we ex-
amine statistical effects of externalities and homophily on diffusion trajectories and on 
inequality at equilibrium.   Cases are 7000 runs of the model, 1000 for each of seven con-
ditions.   Independent variables are dummies for each of six conditions.  (Identity-specific 
externalities without homophily is the reference category).  Dependent variables are 
equilibrium adoption levels (global and for specific population subgroups) (Table 2) and 
indicators of intergroup inequality (logged odds ratios comparing paired subgroups) 
(Table 3). 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Tables 2 and 3 here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Results confirm qualitative interpretations from prior analyses: no takeoffs 
without externalities
15, highest diffusion levels under general externalities, negative 
effects of homophily (under specific externalities) on overall adoption levels, and positive 
effects of homophily on inequality at equilibrium.  These analyses demonstrate that spec-
ific externalities increase inequality in adoption rates by significantly reducing adoption 
by less privileged groups, while exerting modest, often positive, effects on more 
privileged groups’ adoption.   Moreover, the greater the status distance between groups, 
the more homophily exacerbates inequality.  Income effects are strongest for the top 
                                                 
15 We operationalize takeoff as the first time point when at least 1 percent of the population adopted 
Internet since the previous period. According to this definition, takeoff for adoption (i) does not occur by 
T=100 with no network externalities, and occurs (ii) at T=37 with general externalities, and (iii) between 
T=36 and T=20 with specific externalities where homophily ranges from 0.25 to 1. Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---26--- 
tertile as compared to the bottom tertile, with the effect on top-to-middle inequality much 
smaller and on middle-to-bottom even smaller, albeit significant.  Similarly, the effects of 
increases in homophily bias on inequality between college graduates and high-school 
nongraduates exceed the still significant effects on inequality between other subgroups. 
Conclusions to Technology Adoption Case 
Although the model’s purpose is to clarify the behavior of a particular kind of diffusion 
process by highlighting and varying key dimensions of that process, and not to simulate 
the empirical details, it does capture some important dimensions of Internet diffusion.  
Most important, as the model would predict, intergroup inequality in Internet access has 
persisted as group-specific penetration rates have plateaud, dashing hopes that the digital 
divide would vanish on its own.   This is true even though our model exaggerates 
income’s impact on adoption compared to that of education, and neglects the fact that 
adoption reflects not just specific network effects (the appeal of communicating with 
one’s friends and kin through e-mail, messaging, and social media) but also general 
externalities (the desire to benefit from such sites as Wikipedia or eBay that do not 
involve interacting with friends but which become more valuable as the overall user base 
increases in size).  When we modified our model (results available upon request) to 
capture a mixed-mechanism process (both specific and general network effects) by 
adding a term that permitted education (as a proxy for demand for information) to interact 
with overall adoption levels to reduce the reservation price, the effects of education 
relative to income increased, but the qualitative results were unchanged.
16      
                                                 
16 A realistic simulation would more adequately model disadoption, which tends to reinforce inequality as 
users at the edge of the technology’s niche drop out more than others (Popielarz and McPherson1995). A Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---27--- 
To summarize: Like other technology-diffusion models, ours demonstrates that 
network effects steepen the slope and increase the extent of diffusion.   Our results also 
demonstrate a less often appreciated effect:  When externalities are specific to potential 
adopters’ own networks – when, as in the case of most communication devices, ego cares 
less about how many people have adopted than about whether her or his friends and 
family have adopted – externalities interact with homophily to exacerbate the effects of 
social inequality on adoption.  Our analyses help resolve the question with which this 
section began by demonstrating that under almost any range of plausible conditions, and 
barring dramatic public-policy intervention, intergroup adoption rates will not converge.   
This conclusion reinforces inferences drawn from other methods, and enables us to 
understand more clearly the mechanisms that perpetuate inequality.  
Case 2: Internal Migration in Thailand 
Our second case demonstrates the utility of the argument for solving empirical puzzles.   
Whereas the Internet case used a formal model to explore change over time in inequality 
among groups defined by race and socioeconomic status in a national population, our 
second case draws on empirical data collected over two decades to explore change over 
time in inequality among villages in a region of Thailand.   Whereas the point of the first 
case was to document the impact of variation in externality strength and homophily on 
intergroup inequality, the goal of the second is to explore the tendency for homophily to 
                                                                                                                                                 
version of our model that included group-specific disadoption rates (results available on request) generated 
lower equilibrium adoption rates and produced greater inequality, but otherwise retained the qualitative 
features reported earlier. A realistic simulation would also take account of the role of institutions like 
schools and workplaces in introducing people to technology (DiMaggio and Bonikowski 2008), public 
policies aimed at reducing SES differentials in access, endogeneity of networks to technology use, change 
in the Internet (including significant quality improvements) over the diffusion period, interdependence 
among technologies and spatial heterogeneity in cost and availability. It was not our goal to produce such a 
model, which would obscure analysis of the mechanisms our study seeks to understand. Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---28--- 
generate inequality (in the sense of high-variance outcomes) where network effects are 
constant and socioeconomic differences at both the individual and village levels can be 
rigorously controlled.  Rather than attempting to provide a full explanation of rural-urban 
migration, analyses of the Thai data focus on effects of ego networks and homophily on 
aggregate migration at the village level, attending to other factors only as necessary for 
model specification.   
Hypotheses 
Migration flows may begin for many reasons: attempts to increase individual or 
household income, demand for low-wage workers in destination regions, or deteriorating 
economic conditions in sending communities.  The conditions initiating migration flows, 
however, may differ greatly from those that sustain them. Although economic factors 
may continue to stimulate migration, prior migration itself may produce new conditions 
in origin communities that then act as independent causes of migration. As ties 
connecting individuals in origin to migrants in destination spread, they serve as conduits 
of information or assistance for potential migrants (Massey 1990). Remittances from 
migrants change the income and land distributions within origin communities, propelling 
other individuals to migrate as well (Stark and Taylor 1989).  Migration may become 
culturally sanctioned, taking on a symbolic meaning as a rite of passage or affirmation of 
identity (Levitt 1998).  Thus migration flows are partially decoupled from the conditions 
that initiate them, through what Massey (1990) calls ‘cumulative causation of migration’. 
Studies from different contexts have illustrated this process (Dunlevy 1991; Massey and 
Espinosa 1997).  Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---29--- 
Recent research, however, points to spatial and temporal heterogeneity in 
migration outcomes not readily explicable within the cumulative causation framework 
(Curran et al. 2005; Fussell and Massey 2004). Recent evidence from Thailand, based on 
data used here, depicts cumulative causation but also reveals dramatic heterogeneity in 
migration patterns across communities. Whereas migration to urban places reaches mass 
levels in some villages, it lingers at low levels in others (Garip 2008). The heterogeneity 
in migration patterns presents a puzzle that current accounts of migration cannot 
explain.  
We apply the theoretical framework developed in the first part of this paper to 
explain this heterogeneity. First, we contribute to cumulative causation theory by 
focusing on the interconnectedness of migration decisions of socially-related 
individuals.
17 Prior migrants, we contend, provide information and assistance that reduces 
the risks and increases the anticipated benefits of migration. We model migration as a 
diffusion process with network externalities, where the prior adoption of migration in a 
population increases the probability of first-time migration for remaining non-adopters. 
We further argue that potential migrants’ choices are more likely to be influenced by 
prior migrants to whom they are socially connected.   We identify household, village and 
regional ties as three broad categories of social relations that channel diffusion of 
migration.  
Second, we investigate how social homophily moderates the impact of network 
externalities, and creates differential migration diffusion patterns across communities. 
Using time-varying information on characteristics of all individuals (within an age range) 
                                                 
17 Van de Rijt’s (2009) study of the diffusion of “assimilation” among migrants provides the only formal 
model of choice interdependence in the context of migration.  Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---30--- 
in the study villages, we produce measures of homogeneity that serve as proxies for 
homophily.  (As described below, we base this decision on high correlations between 
overall homogeneity and ego-network homogeneity [in agricultural mutual-assistance 
networks] for the one year for which reliable measures of both variables are available.)   
We focus on how aggregate change in migration rates over time is associated with 
village-level homogeneity. 
We test four hypotheses about the relationship between network effects, 
externalities, and migration, each subject to ceteris paribus conditions and modeled with 
extensive controls.   
 The first hypothesis is based on the expectation that migration in earlier time 
periods reduces risks and raises expected rewards of current migration.  If this is the case, 
then: 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the number of prior migrants, the higher the migration 
rate. 
In testing this hypothesis we replicate results of previous research demonstrating positive 
network effects on migration (Massey and Espinosa 1997).   
The second hypothesis addresses the effect of social homogeneity (viewed as a 
proxy for network homophily) on migration rates.  Previous research suggests that social 
homogeneity reduces the diversity of information entering a population, limiting 
members’ ability to learn from prior experience (Garip 2008).  Homogeneity limits the 
number of channels through which migrants are recruited, the diversity of positions they 
occupy in urban destinations, and the diversity of urban social ties to which their 
experiences gives other villagers access.   Thus: Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---31--- 
Hypothesis 2: The more homogeneous the population, the lower the rate of 
migration. 
Note that this hypothesis is consistent with results from the Internet-diffusion case, which 
demonstrated that diffusion levels decline as social homophily increases.   
The third hypothesis addresses the role of social homogeneity (again, proxying 
homophily) in moderating the strength of network effects.   We anticipate that even if 
(per hypothesis 2) homogeneity reduces migration rates by limiting access to available 
information, homogeneous villages circulate whatever information prior migrants provide 
more efficiently than more heterogeneous places.  As Putnam (2007) has argued, social 
heterogeneity may reduce social cohesion.  This, in turn, may reduce the velocity and 
scope of information flow, concentrating network effects on subsets of the population.  
By contrast, homogeneous populations may experience benefits of prior migration more 
quickly and broadly.
18 Moreover, persons in homogeneous populations may be more 
likely to identify with prior migrants, and hence benefit more from the latter’s 
experiences.
19 If this is the case: 
Hypothesis 3: The more homogeneous the population, the stronger the effect of 
prior on current migration).    
  The fourth hypothesis applies to the village, rather than the individual, level of 
analysis.   In the Internet case, we found that homophily exacerbated intergroup 
                                                 
18 Alternately one might argue that homogeneity could interact negatively with the number of prior 
migrants if each migrant brings back less useful information (as per Hypothesis 2), in that relatively 
heterogeneous village networks would connect potential migrants to prior migrants who could provide in-
formation about a more diverse set of destinations or work options. We opt for Hypothesis 3 because we 
expect heterogeneity’s positive impact to be captured by its direct effect, rather than by its interaction with 
prior migration.  
 
19 We thank an external reviewer for pointing this out. Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---32--- 
inequality.   By analogy, we anticipate that among Thai villages, social homogeneity will 
increase variance in outcomes by amplifying the effects of initial differences.  
Hypothesis 4:  At the village population level, variance in migration rates will be 
higher among homogeneous villages than among heterogeneous villages.   
Data and Methods 
Data come from the Nang Rong Survey of 22 migrant-sending villages between 1972 and 
2000, when Thailand’s economy shifted from agriculture to manufacturing, propelling 
migration from rural areas to Bangkok and other urban destinations.
20  Nang Rong, a 
relatively poor district in an historically poor region of Thailand, has been an important 
source of migrants to urban centers, primarily Bangkok.  
Migration flows from this area once consisted mostly of seasonal migrants 
seeking alternative livelihoods during droughts that preceded the monsoon rains 
(Phongpaichit 1990).  This seasonal character began to change in the mid-1980s.  As 
growing manufacturing exports increased labor demand in Bangkok and its provinces 
(Bello, Cunningham, and Poh 1998),
21 rural migrants in their teens and early twenties, 
mostly from Northeastern Thailand (including Nang Rong), flocked to urban factory, 
construction and service jobs at unprecedented rates.   Although most migration remained 
temporary, durations increased.   
                                                 
20 Nang Rong Survey is a collaborative effort between the University of North Carolina and Mahidol 
University, Thailand. More information is available at: http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/nangrong. 
21 This growth, and its centralization in Bangkok, accompanied transitions in the Thai political system from 
an authoritarian monarchy to a semi-democratic bourgeois polity dominated by the entrepreneurial class 
(Somrudee 1993).  Business’s increasing political power exacerbated developmental inequality among 
regions through the 1980s.  Dramatic economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s disproportionately benefited 
Bangkok, and the most dynamic sectors of the Thai economy remained concentrated around Bangkok, 
employing labor from the rural periphery (Mills 1999). Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---33--- 
In 1984, the first year of the Nang Rong Survey and roughly the beginning of the 
period of dramatic growth in rural-urban flows, the 22 study villages looked similar. 
Ranging from 340 to 380 kilometers in distance from Bangkok, they shared common 
economic features.  Rice cultivation was the primary economic activity: 87 percent of 
respondents listed farm work as their main occupation with little variation across villages.  
Only one village had a nearby factory to provide an alternative to agriculture work.  None 
of the villages had phone lines and only seven had electricity.   The villages were similar 
in size, the number of households ranging from 70 to 154 with a median of 124; and in 
ethnic composition (inferred from language spoken in household).  In fifteen villages 
more than 90 percent of households primarily spoke Central Thai; in the others, the 
majority spoke either Lao or Cambodian (Khmer).  Language homogeneity, measured on 
a scale from 0 to 1, averaged 0.90 across villages.  Given initial similarities (and 
controlling statistically for observed differences), one would expect similar rural-urban 
migration patterns across villages in the following years. 
Data. We observe migration patterns using three waves of data, collected in 1984, 
1994, and 2000.  The 1984 wave was a census of all village residents, including inform-
ation on demographic characteristics, household assets and village institutions.
22 The 
1994 wave followed all 1984 respondents still living in the original village (along with 
new village residents), and included a retrospective life-history component collecting in-
formation about migration experiences of all individuals between aged 13 to 35 (the 
group at most risk for migration) from age 13 onward.  The 1994 survey also interviewed 
migrants in the four major destinations (Bangkok, the Eastern Seaboard, Korat and 
                                                 
22 Surveys were conducted in 51 villages, but we use data only from the 22 villages for which migrants 
were followed up in destinations in subsequent waves.  Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---34--- 
Buriram), reaching about 70 percent of eligible migrants (Rindfuss et al. 2007).  Previous 
research establishes that missing information from unlocatable migrants is unlikely to 
bias results on migration patterns (Garip and Curran 2009). The 2000 wave followed the 
1994 respondents and added new residents to the database.  It also collected retrospective 
life-history information about migration experiences starting at age thirteen from all 
village residents aged 18 to 41 and from migrants in the four destinations.  
Thus our results apply to individuals who were between the ages of 13 and 35 in 
1994.  For a 35-year-old migrant in 1994, for example, we observe annual migration 
moves retrospectively from 1972, when the individual was 13, to year 2000, when he or 
she turned 41. As a result, the age composition of the sample at risk of migrating varies 
over time, containing only 13 year olds in 1972, 13 to 25 year olds in 1984, and 13 to 35 
year olds in 1994.  (We ran our statistical models with year dummies to take into account 
the varying age structure over time. The results, available upon request, did not change.)  
The retrospective life histories span the period 1972 to 2000, allowing us to model 
the diffusion of individual migration over time.
23 Significant variability in these diffusion 
patterns among villages provides a unique opportunity to discover the social mechanisms 
that create heterogeneous migration outcomes among all villages.   
  Measures. Because our interest is in the diffusion of practices, we focus on first 
migration moves and define migrant status in each year with a binary indicator that 
equals 1 if the index person lived away from Nang Rong for more than two consecutive 
                                                 
23 Left-censorship of retrospective data is not a problem as urban migration in this region took off only in 
the 1980s:  as late as 1984, the percentage of migrants among all village residents ranged from 1 to 7 
percent in the study villages (Korinek, Entwisle and Jampaklay 2005; Rindfuss et al. 2007). Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---35--- 
months for the first time.
24 This criterion restricts migrant status to labor migrants, 
excluding persons who make trips of brief duration.   We operationalize village-level 
homogeneity with respect to two dimensions, education and occupation, likely to shape 
individuals’ migration opportunities, and the nature of information they can provide to 
household or village members once they migrate.
25  There are six occupational 
categories: student, farm work, factory, construction, service, and other.  Homogeneity is 
measured as the complement of two diversity measures: the logarithm of variance for the 
ordinal attribute of education, and Shannon’s entropy for the categorical attribute of 
occupation. In raw form, these diversity measures capture village-level heterogeneity 
rather than homogeneity, so, after normalizing them to [0,1] range, we compute 
homogeneity as 1-diversity.
26    
In our analysis, we use village-level measures as a proxy for homophily, because 
village homogeneity is available in each year, whereas homophily can be estimated 
reliably only for one year (2000, when data were collected on rice-harvesting networks 
among households).   To assess the relationship between homogeneity and homophily 
(estimated based on homogeneity within ego-networks), we treated all individuals in 
connected households as also connected; measured educational and occupational 
homophily in each individual’s network with the logarithm of variance and Shannon’s 
                                                 
24 The Nang Rong life history survey defines a “migrant” as someone who has had a spell of greater than 
two consecutive months living in an urban place.  
25 Education and occupation, when coded an ordinal scale (increasing in degree for the former, and in 
average earnings for the latter), are positively associated (polychoric correlation coefficient=0.31). 
Polychoric correlation uses the qualitative knowledge on the ordering of categories, and provides a more 
accurate measure of association in the case of ordinal variables compared with the Pearson’s correlation.  
26 Results are robust to alternative diversity measures. Using an index of qualitative variation (Lieberson, 
1969) instead of Shannon’s entropy for the categorical occupation measure does not affect results, and us-
ing a Gini coefficient instead of log variance for the variable leaves the results unchanged. Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---36--- 
entropy, respectively; took the mean ego-network homogeneity (with respect to education 
and occupation, respectively) for each village; and correlated these with village-level 
homogeneity on each dimension.  Village-level homogeneity and and ego-network 
homogeneity were correlated at 0.82 for education and 0.55 for occupation, thus 
justifying the inference that effects of homogeneity may reflect mechanisms in which 
homophily plays a critical role.   
To capture effects of network externalities, we define households, villages and the 
entire Nang Rong region as possible diffusion channels for migration.
27  For each 
individual, we count the number of prior migrants in the household (excluding the index 
individual) and village (excluding the index individual’s household) through the previous 
year. We also compute a global count of prior migrants in all villages in Nang Rong 
(excluding the index individual’s village). By comparing the effects of household and 
village migration rates, on the one hand, and global migration rates on the other, we 
assess the relative importance of specific and general network externalities for inducing 
migration flows.  
To compute homogeneity and migration-experience indicators, we use annual 
information from the age group included in the life history surveys rather than data on the 
whole village population captured in the 1984, 1994 and 2000 censuses.
28 By focusing 
upon the population at risk of migrating, we implicitly assume that the characteristics of 
                                                 
27 We also considered potential connections across villages. We grouped villages using various criteria: (i) 
sub-district membership, (ii) 5 km periphery, (iii) 10 km periphery, (iv) bus route connections, (v) worker-
hiring relations, and (vi) temple-sharing relations, and assessed the impact of the number of migrants in 
ego’s network from the village cluster (excluding those from ego’s own village). In all cases, the effects of 
these village-group indicators were negligible and insignificant and the effects of household, village and 
Nang-Rong level networks remained robust  (results available upon request). Therefore, we conclude that 
household, village and district ties delineate the main diffusion channels for migration. 
28 We use information from migrants in destinations, as well as residents in origin villages, to compute the 
village-level homogeneity measures to ensure that these measures are not endogenous to migration.  Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---37--- 
one’s peers who are also at risk of migrating are the only ones that are consequential for 
the migration decision.
29  
Finally, to rule out alternative explanations, we control for several characteristics 
sometimes associated with social and economic incentives for migrating. For each 
individual, we include indicators of age, sex, education and marital status.  At the 
household level, we measure household members’ landholdings, both as a proxy for 
household’s wealth and as a direct influence on migration. Also included is the household 
dependency ratio (ratio of those older than 64 or younger than 15 to those who are 
neither). At the village level, we control for the presence of schools, newspaper reading 
centers, factories, rice mills, the availability of electricity, and population.
30 (See Table 
B1 in Appendix B for descriptive statistics.)  
Analytic Approach: Individual-level Analysis.  To model the individual-level 
diffusion of migration, we use event-history methods, which allow us to account for the 
timing of migration and censoring in data (i.e., not every individual migrates before the 
end of the study period) (Strang 1991). An individual’s decision to migrate is modeled as 
a process occurring over time, where the numbers of prior migrants in household, village, 
                                                 
29 Our fieldwork suggests that this assumption is reasonable. In focus group interviews that one of the 
authors conducted in the study villages in 2005, most migrants reported receiving help from their peers 
rather than their elders. Help from peers was more useful because peers were more likely to have worked in 
the service or factory jobs most available to new migrants.  If we relax this assumption and measure 
experience and homophily for all village residents, albeit cross-sectionally based on the censuses in 1984, 
1994 and 2000, we obtain very similar results, because measures based on the population at risk are highly 
correlated with those based on the whole population. The correlation between the number of migrants in the 
whole population and those in the at-risk population is 0.43 in 1984.  The correlation between the education 
(occupation) homogeneity measures in the full versus the restricted sample is 0.78 (0.90) in 1984, 0.72 
(0.86) in 1994 and 0.89 (0.71) in 2000. 
30 The life history information goes back to 1972, but household and village surveys start in 1984. We 
assume that the household and village characteristics (dependency ratio, land, village population, factories 
and rice mills) are at their 1984 values from 1972 to 1983. If we relax this assumption and restrict our 
analysis to data from the 1984-2000 period, our results remain unchanged. (Results available upon request). Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---38--- 
or Nang Rong are time-varying factors affecting the hazard of adoption. We use the 
proportional hazards model,  
i i i z t x t h γ β α + + = ) ( ) ( log     (1) 
in which the dependent variable is hi(t), the hazard of first migration at time t for 
individual i, α is a constant, xi(t) is a vector of time-varying covariates characterizing 
individual i, and zi is a vector of time-constant covariates for individual i .  β is a vector 
of parameters describing effects of time-varying covariates on the hazard rate, and γ  is a 
vector of parameters describing effects of time-constant variables on that rate.
31  
  From our theoretical perspective, this model’s most important component is the 
vector xi(t), which includes the number of adopters in an individual’s household and 
village (excluding the household), and in the Nang Rong region (excluding the village). 
We use these indicators to test the first hypothesis, which posits positive effects of prior 
on current migration. By comparing the magnitude and significance of the corresponding 
β parameters for these indicators, we can also evaluate the relative importance for 
migration of different foci of social relations (Feld 1981).  If household ties are the sole 
relations structuring the diffusion of migration, individual adoption rates will rise with 
the number of prior adopters in the household.  If village ties are important influences on 
adoption, an individual’s choice to migrate will also increase with the number of villagers 
who have already migrated.  
Village educational and occupational homogeneity are also of keen interest, 
varying over time and also part of xi(t).  To test the second and third hypotheses -- which, 
respectively, predict lower migration rates and stronger network effects as village-level 
                                                 
31 A discrete-time hazard model (with a logit transformation and year dummies) leads to similar results 
(results available upon request). Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---39--- 
homogeneity increases -- we add the homogeneity measures as well as interaction terms 
between these measures and the number of prior migrants in the village.  We also include 
the controls described above. 
To evaluate alternative explanations, we employ several robustness checks 
(available upon request).  First, we introduce village fixed effects to ensure that results 
are not driven by unmeasured village attributes.  Second, we use bootstrapping (with re-
sampling at the village-level) to test the sensitivity of results to the exclusion of specific 
villages. Third, we include year effects to control for unmeasured idiosyncratic shocks 
over time. None of these altered our results.  
  Analytic Approach: Village-level Analysis.   To evaluate the fourth hypothesis, 
which posits more divergent migration rates among more homogenous villages, we use 
regression analysis to compare the variance in migration patterns among villages 
categorized as high, medium or low in educational and occupational homogeneity.  We 
anticipate that the greater degree of homophily in more homogeneous villages will 
amplify small initial advantages, causing variance to grow. 
Results: Migration as a Diffusion Process with Specific Network Externalities 
We model individuals’ first migration as a diffusion process, where prior adoption rates 
among social contacts influence future adoption; and  explore  the village-level 
implications of these network-driven processes over time.   The empirical results both 
confirm expectations based on the agent-based model of Internet diffusion and suggest 
that network externalities and homophily may generate inequality (in this case, between 
villages) even in the absence of differences in initial endowments.  Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---40--- 
Trends in migration.  We begin by observing the cumulative number of migration 
events between 1972 and 2000 in Nang Rong. The cumulative number of adopters (i.e. 
migrants) approaches an S-shaped curve over time (Fig. 10), while the frequency of new 
adopters per year approximates a normal, bell-shaped curve (Fig. 11). Early in the 
diffusion process, relatively few individuals adopt in each time period. Gradually, the 
adoption rate  accelerates until many of the region’s residents have migrated. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figures 10, 11 and 12 here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The uniform path displayed in Figure 10 conceals variation across villages. This 
variation becomes apparent in the box plot in Figure 12, which demonstrates the 
distribution of cumulative migrants as a percent of village population across villages for 
each year between 1972 and 2000. Not only is there variation in the cumulative 
percentage of migrants across villages in each year, but this variation grows over time. 
(Similar patterns are observed for annual, rather than cumulative, percentages.) Due to 
this persistent and increasing between-village inequality in migration rates, prior work 
suggests, some villages in Nang Rong become integrated into the urban economy, 
whereas others remain isolated (Garip 2008). 
If diffusion of migration were a population-level process operating within Nang 
Rong, we would expect similar adoption rates across villages, especially given the 
villages’ economic and demographic similarity. The substantial variation in migration 
rates suggests that diffusion channels are specific to villages and not region-wide. 
Network effects on migration.  We investigate three possible diffusion channels. 
The first is membership in the same household. Because migration is a risky undertaking, Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---41--- 
individuals are likely to rely on family ties to obtain trustworthy information about 
migration opportunities (Massey and Espinosa 1997). A second plausible channel of 
diffusion is village networks. Individuals are more likely to know migrants in their own 
village than outside their village. Reciprocity operates strongly within villages; 
individuals receive information or help from their fellow villagers with the expectation of 
reciprocating in the future (Portes and Landolt 2000).   
A final channel of diffusion is Nang Rong region. Whereas the first two diffusion 
channels represent specific network externalities (identities of alters are known and 
significant to the individual), the third channel reflects general network externalities, 
where alters are likely to be anonymous. Specific network externalities accrue through 
information or help household or village members provide to potential migrants, which 
reduces the risks of migration.  General network externalities, by contrast, work through 
regional institutions that develop over time to support migration flows. For instance, as 
one of the authors observed in her fieldwork, high migration flows from Nang Rong 
prompted urban employers to send recruiters, fostering more migration. 
Table 4 displays results for four individual-level models of migration diffusion 
between 1973 and 2000. The baseline model includes exogenous variables that may in-
fluence an individual’s hazard of migrating. Estimates indicate that migration rates 
decline with age, increase with education, and are higher for men than for women and for 
unmarried than for married individuals.  Rates of first migration decline with the size of 
household landholdings and increase as the household dependency ratio rises.  Village 
characteristics that increase migration rates include population, presence of a newspaper Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---42--- 
reading center (where residents may mingle and share information about migration exper-
iences) and the availability of electricity (a proxy for economic development). 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 4 here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Models 1, 2 and 3 successively add network parameters to the baseline model. 
Model 1 presents the results for diffusion through the household channel. Models 2 and 3, 
respectively, introduce prior migrants in the village and in other Nang Rong villages.  
Likelihood ratio tests (Table 4, lower panel) show that each covariate improves model fit 
significantly.  Model 3, which includes all three covariates representing alternative 
diffusion channels in mean-deviation form demonstrates that the migration rate 
significantly increases with the number of migration events in the household, village, and 
Nang Rong.  Of these, the number of migrants in the household affects migration most 
strongly, followed by the number of migrants in the village, and then, at a distance, the 
number of migrants in Nang Rong.  One additional migrant in the household has the same 
effect on the migration rate as do about 200 more migrants in the village or about 800 
more in the region.  These results provide strong support for the first hypothesis, and 
underscore the importance of specific, rather than general, network externalities for rural-
urban migration, with the effect of others’ behavior on an individual’s migration chances 
increasing with social proximity.  
  Social homogeneity, network externalities and migration. Table 5 reports results 
for a test of the second hypothesis, which posits that higher village homogeneity (a proxy 
for homophily) depresses migration rates.  Indicators of village educational and occupat-Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---43--- 
ional homogeneity are highly correlated (Pearson’s correlation = 0.74), so each is in-
cluded in a different model, standardized to [0,1] range and centered around its mean. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 5 here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
As per hypothesis 2, we expect status homogeneity (which, as we have seen is 
highly correlated with indicators of status homophily at the village level) to limit the 
diversity of information available to potential migrants, and thus to depress village 
migration rates. Model 1 supports this expectation: a unit increase above the mean level 
of educational homogeneity reduces the rate of first migration by 61.7 percent (0.383-1=-
0.617).  The model also controls for village-level mean education, which does not 
significantly affect migration. The effect of occupation homogeneity estimated in Model 
3, is similar; a unit increase above the mean reduces the rate of first migration by 58 
percent (0.420-1=-0.580).  
The third hypothesis suggests that network effects increase with village status 
homogeneity due to increased cohesion and velocity of information flows between past 
and current migrants. To test this hypothesis, we interact the number of prior village mi-
grants with education homogeneity in Model 2 and with occupation homogeneity in 
Model 4. Likelihood ratio tests show a significant improvement in fit compared to models 
without the interaction term. The positive coefficient estimates for the interaction terms, 
in both Models 2 and 4, provide strong support for the hypothesis. These results suggest 
that whereas homogeneity (in education or occupation) has a negative direct effect on the 
rate of first migration (consistent with Hypothesis 2), it has a positive indirect effect by 
strengthening network externalities (as posited by Hypothesis 3). Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---44--- 
Explaining Heterogeneity in Migration Patterns across Villages. We now turn to 
Hypothesis 4: Can the model of network externalities and social homophily developed in 
this paper help to explain the puzzling divergence of in migration patterns across similar 
Thai villages? 
  The individual-level models presented above suggest that village social 
homogeneity reduces migration rates, but increases the impact of number of prior mi-
grants on the rates of migration.  By amplifying effects of prior migration, homogeneity 
(and, by implication, homophily) increases inequality among villages over time.  This 
boosts the effects of prior migration for villages with many migrants and penalizes vil-
lages with relatively few.  By contrast, where heterogeneity is high, migration is driven 
primarily by individual-level factors and household experience, generating less divergent 
village outcomes.  In other words, because social homogeneity is associated with network 
homophily, which amplifies the effect of network externalities, we should observe a wid-
er dispersion of migration patterns among homogeneous villages than among villages 
with medium or low homogeneity. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 6 here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
We classify the 22 villages into high-, medium or low-homogeneity tertiles with 
respect to educational and occupational homogeneity, so that each group contains seven 
or eight villages each year.  We compute the dispersion of the cumulative number of 
migrants across the villages in each group using the gini coefficient. We expect between-
village dispersion to be higher in villages with high homogeneity. To test this Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---45--- 
expectation, we regress dispersion on the binary indicators for the homogeneity classes. 
Observing three groups over 28 years yields 84 cases. 
Estimates from an OLS model including year dummies as controls (Table 6) 
demonstrate that dispersion in migration outcomes is wider among villages with medium 
education homogeneity compared to those with low homogeneity (the reference 
category), and wider still among the most homogeneous villages.  Results in the second 
column show similar patterns for classes based on occupational homogeneity: dispersion 
in migration outcomes is widest among villages with high occupation homogeneity, 
followed by villages with medium and low homogeneity, respectively.  These results 
provide support for the hypothesis that social homogeneity, through its impact on 
network externalities, exacerbates inequality between villages in migration outcomes.  
Indeed it suggests that this mechanism can generate inequality based on small initial 
differences in ways that could not be predicted based on initial endowment. 
32 
Conclusion 
We argue that inequality emerges from the union of distinctive forms of interdependence, 
those that make courses of action more productive or less risky for actors whose friends 
and associates also pursue them; and those that lead people to form networks with alters 
of similar status.  Inequality, we contend, is produced by the interaction of these two 
features of social structure: network externalities and homophily.    
                                                 
32 See Salganik, Dodds and Watts (2006) for a similar finding in an experimental context. 
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  We have presented two studies.  The first was a computational model of changing 
intergroup inequality in access to the Internet over the course of that technology’s diffus-
ion.  The second was an empirical study of trends in rural-urban migration in 22 Thai 
villages.  The insight that interdependent choice processes under conditions of homophily 
generate inequality helped to illuminate each of these very different phenomena and 
yielded strikingly similar conclusions.    
The first parallel was the network effects on individual-level choice, an 
assumption built into the Internet computational model and an empirical finding for Thai 
migration.   The second result that emerged from the Internet model and was observed 
again in the migration study is that homophily (and the homogeneous networks it 
produces) tends to depress individual-level adoption.   The third result, which again both 
emerged from the computational model and was observed in the Thai data, is that 
homophily stimulates positive network effects when adopters share networks.   The 
fourth and most important result is that interdependent choices with network externalities 
under conditions of homophily generate inequality.  In the Internet case, this mechanism 
augmented existing inequality between groups defined on the basis of income, education, 
and race.  In the Thai case, it contributed to the emergence of inequality among initially 
similar villages.      
  These results demonstrate the utility and value of the approach we propose.  Yet 
many questions remain about the scope of these mechanisms.  Not all practices have 
positive externalities: consumption of many goods and services is competitive, with one 
person’s enjoyment detracting from, rather than enhancing, another’s.  Moreover, only 
some network externalities are identity-specific rather than general: We want enough Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---47--- 
people to like sushi for our favorite Japanese restaurant to keep its doors open and its 
servings fresh, or to contribute to our favorite charity that it can continue to promote 
causes we cherish, but we don’t much care who those people are.   A challenge for 
further work is to estimate the contribution of the mechanisms described here to overall 
inequality and how that contribution has changed over time.   
A second question is whether such mechanisms may under certain conditions un-
dermine inequality.  At the onset of the Internet, when young people seemed peculiarly 
able to master the technology, some suspected that the Internet would provide equal 
opportunity for young people from all backgrounds.  That never happened.  But there 
may be status-conferring or lucrative activities in which subaltern groups possess initial 
advantages that identity-specific externalities amplify.  The advantages of African-
American youth  in hip-hop and basketball, or of young French-Canadian men in ice 
hockey,  while posing little challenge to entrenched privilege, nonetheless suggest how 
externalities and homophily can combine to benefit non-elites.   
A third question has to do with the potential of this mechanism to exacerbate in-
tergroup differences in risk and harm.  The risks of smoking cigarettes, for example, are 
greater if your network reinforces your behavior, discourages quitting, and teaches you to 
value the practice (Christakis and Fowler 2008).  Unprotected sex is a greater risk in 
networks where members deride condom use than in milieus in which condom use is 
widespread (Tavory and Swidler 2009).   If externalities were entirely negative – if their 
only effect were to raise the cost or reduce the benefit of a behavior – then externalities 
would discourage adoption.  But in both cases, in-groups offer salient short-term rewards 
(affiliation, identity, status, participation in shared rituals), alongside long-term, Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---48--- 
discountable risks.  To the extent that these networks are characterized by status homoph-
ily, such cases illustrate a potentially powerful source of cumulative disadvantage.        
There is still much we do not understand about the ways that networks produce 
cumulative advantage by enhancing the value of new practices to their adopters.   
Nonetheless, the results reported in this paper establish the importance of network 
externalities in differentiated diffusion networks as a mechanism that must be taken into 
account if we are to understand the structural bases of social inequality.  Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---49--- 
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics for Thai Village Data 
Table B1. Descriptive Statistics for Thia Village Data (1973-2000)
Variable Mean
Standard 
deviation
Minimum Maximum
Individual level (N = 50,198 person-years)
Age 21.87 6.70 14 41
Sex (Male=1) 0.44 0.50 0 1
Years of education 5.72 2.31 0 19
Married 0.39 0.49 0 1
Household land (rai) 27.75 25.85 0 209
Household dependency ratio 0.69 0.59 0 6
Village level (N = 616 village-years)
Village population 641.14 147.71 347 1020
Factory w/in 5km of village? 0.22 0.41 0 1
Number of rice mills 2.97 1.67 0 7
School in village? 0.58 0.49 0 1
Newspaper reading center in village? 0.31 0.46 0 1
Years since village electrified 4.11 5.27 0 20
Cumulative no of village migrants in prior year 85.57 78.49 0 328
Number of annual migrants 7.65 5.65 0 36
Education homophily in year [0,1] 0.23 0.13 0 1
Occupation homophily in year [0,1] 0.51 0.23 0 1Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---60--- 
FIGURES 
  Fig. 1: Stylized diffusion curves for two pairs of populations 
  
 
 
Figure 2: Ratios of odds that selected comparison groups of Americans 18 and over have Internet service in their homes, 1997-2007.   
Source: Current Population Survey; Graphs created by Bart Bonikowski 
  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Diffusion Trajectories for Seven Conditions of Network Externalities and Homophily Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---63--- 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Odds Ratios of Diffusion Rates for Highest as compared to Lowest Income Classes in 6 
Conditions of Externalities and Homophily Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---64--- 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Odds Ratios of Diffusion Rates for College Graduates as compared to Agents without 
High School Degrees in 6 Conditions of Externalities and Homophily 
 Externalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---65--- 
 
 
 
Figure 6:  Odds Ratios of Diffusion Rates for Whites as compared to Blacks in 6 
Conditions of Externalities and Homophily 
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Figure 7: Changes in the Estimated Coefficient of Log (Income) Over Time for 6 
Conditions of Externalities and Homophily 
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Figure 8: Changes in the Estimated Coefficient of Education over Time for 6 
Conditions of Externalities and Homophily 
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Figure 9: Changes in the Estimated Coefficient of Race (White, as compared to Black) 
Over Time for 6 Conditions of Externalities and Homophily 
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Figure 10: Diffusion of Migration in Nang Rong 
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Figure 11: Number of New Migrants Each Year 
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Figure 12: Dispersion of Cumulative Percentage of Migrants across Villages over Time 
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TABLES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. The Cases Compared
Internet Thai migration
Behavior Adoption Migration
Method Agent-based model Empirical analyses
Empirical focus Intergroup inequality Inter-village inequality
Homophily measured at 
level of 
Ego network Village
Key mechanism Direct: Increased 
utility due to 
interactions with net 
alters
Indirect: Diminished risk 
due to information 
provided by net alters 
 
 
   
Table 2.  Linear Regression of Adoption Levels on Experimental Conditions
(Reference: Homophily = 0)
No network externalities  -0.516 ** -0.536 ** -0.399 ** -0.685 ** -0.238 ** -0.611 ** -0.351 **
General network externalities 0.030 ** 0.028 ** 0.043 ** 0.032 ** 0.017 ** 0.023 ** 0.030 **
Homophily = 0.25 -0.003 ** -0.001 -0.012 ** 0.009 ** -0.014 ** 0.005 ** -0.011 **
Homophily = 0.5 -0.005 ** -0.002 ** -0.024 ** 0.017 ** -0.028 ** 0.010 ** -0.024 **
Homophily = 0.75 -0.011 ** -0.006 ** -0.040 ** 0.024 ** -0.046 ** 0.012 ** -0.043 **
Homophily = 1  -0.019 ** -0.012 ** -0.061 ** 0.029 ** -0.067 ** 0.015 ** -0.068 **
Intercept 0.618 ** 0.647 ** 0.454 ** 0.925 ** 0.249 ** 0.788 ** 0.392 **
R
2 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.96 0.99 0.96
N 7000 7000 7000 7000 7000 7000 7000
RACE INCOME EDUCATION
**p<0.01, * p<0.05.  All independent variables are binary. Both dependent and independent variables are measured on the final period 
of simulations (T=100). 
All Whites Blacks
High 
income
Low 
income
BA 
education
Less than 
high schoolExternalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---74--- 
(Reference: Homophily = 0)
No network externalities  -0.02 ** -0.13 ** 0.02 * -0.15 ** -0.07 ** -0.05 ** -0.13 **
General network externalities -0.05 ** 0.51 ** 0.41 ** 0.10 ** 0.02 * 0.01 0.06 **
Homophily = 0.25 0.04 ** 0.21 ** 0.15 ** 0.06 ** 0.08 ** 0.05 ** 0.06 **
Homophily = 0.5 0.09 ** 0.43 ** 0.31 ** 0.13 ** 0.16 ** 0.10 ** 0.13 **
Homophily = 0.75 0.14 ** 0.67 ** 0.46 ** 0.21 ** 0.26 ** 0.14 ** 0.22 **
Homophily = 1  0.20 ** 0.93 ** 0.62 ** 0.31 ** 0.39 ** 0.20 ** 0.33 **
Intercept 0.79 ** 3.62 ** 1.87 ** 1.76 ** 1.75 ** 1.01 ** 1.54 **
R
2 0.28 0.66 0.57 0.29 0.41 0.35 0.27
N 7000 7000 7000 7000 7000 7000 7000
High/Low 
income 
High/Medium 
income
INCOME
Medium/Low 
income 
Table 3.  Linear Regression of  Logged Odds Ratios on Experimental Conditions
**p<0.01, * p<0.05.  All independent variables are binary. Both dependent and independent variables are measured on the final period of 
simulations (T=100). 
BA/Less 
than high 
school
BA/High 
school 
Some college/ 
Less than high 
school
EDUCATION
White/Black 
RACE 
 
 
Variable
Age 0.941 ** 0.940 ** 0.935 ** 0.932 **
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Sex (Male=1) 1.132 ** 1.143 ** 1.134 ** 1.133 **
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Years of education 1.098 ** 1.097 ** 1.091 ** 1.085 **
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Married 0.619 ** 0.623 ** 0.618 ** 0.618 **
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Household land (in 10 rais) 0.973 ** 0.968 ** 0.970 ** 0.972 **
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Household dependency ratio 1.242 ** 1.262 ** 1.232 ** 1.221 **
(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
Village population (in 100s) 1.038 ** 1.034 ** 1.010 1.023
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Factory w/in 5km of village? 0.976 0.986 1.011 0.999
(0.049) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050)
Number of rice mills (in 10s) 1.061 1.072 1.085 1.073
(0.129) (0.131) (0.131) (0.130)
School in village? 0.992 1.004 0.977 0.982
(0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043)
Newspaper reading center in village? 1.202 ** 1.183 ** 1.123 ** 1.129 **
(0.049) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047)
Years since village electrified 1.011 ** 1.005 0.986 ** 0.977 **
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
No of prior migrants in household 1.105 ** 1.083 ** 1.077 **
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
No of prior migrants in village (excl. hh, in 100s) 1.262 ** 1.151 **
(0.049) (0.057)
No of prior migrants in Nang Rong (excl. village, in 100s) 1.010 **
(0.004)
N (person-years at risk) 50,198   50,198   50,198   50,198   
Likelihood ratio χ
2 vs. prior model 50.17 ** 35.23 ** 8.53 **
**p<0.01, *p<0.05. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Results are presented in hazard ratios.
(3) Nang Rong
Diffusion Channel
Table 4. Proportional Hazards Model of Individual Migration in 22 Nang Rong Villages (1973-2000)
(0) Baseline (1) Household (2) VillageExternalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---76--- 
Variable
No of prior migrants in household 1.076 ** 1.061 ** 1.063 ** 1.048 **
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
No of prior migrants in village (excl. hh, in 100s) 1.132 * 1.254 ** 1.193 ** 1.467 **
(0.060) (0.068) (0.071) (0.091)
No of prior migrants in Nang Rong (excl. village, in 100s) 1.013 ** 1.002 1.014 ** 1.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Mean education in village 0.972 1.037
(0.062) (0.069)
% working in a farm in village 0.990 * 0.988 **
(0.004) (0.004)
% working in a factory in village 0.996 1.013
(0.007) (0.008)
% working in construction in village 1.007 1.023
(0.014) (0.014)
% working in service in village 0.922 ** 0.999
(0.017) (0.020)
Homogeneity in year [0,1] 0.383 * 1.857 0.420 * 1.757
(0.159) (0.857) (0.178) (0.805)
Homogeneity x No of prior migs in village  1.036 ** 1.018 **
(0.004) (0.002)
N (person-years at risk) 50,198    50,198      50,198     50,198  
Likelihood ratio χ
2 vs. model w/o interaction 102.89 ** 96.63 **
**p<0.01, *p<0.05. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Results are presented in hazard ratios.
a Controls for age, sex, years of education, marital status, houshold land and dependency ratio, population, factories, 
rice mills, schools, newspaper reading center and electrification in the village are included. The variables used in the 
interaction term (homogeneity and no of prior migrants in village) are mean-centered.
Table 5.  Proportional Hazards Model of Individual Migration in 22 Nang Rong Villages (1973-2000)
a
(4)
Occupation Homogeneity
(3) (1) (2)
Education HomogeneityExternalities, Homophily, and Inequality ---77--- 
 
Variable
Medium homogeneity group (0/1) 0.07 ** 0.06 *
(0.01) (0.02)
High homogeneity group (0/1) 0.13 ** 0.16 **
(0.01) (0.02)
R2 0.82 0.80
N 84 84
Occupation 
Homogeneity
Education 
Homogeneity
Table 6. OLS Model of the Dispersion in Village-Level Migration in 22 
Nang Rong Villages (1973-2000)
*p<0.05; **p<0.01. Std errors given in parentheses. Unit of analysis is 84 
village-clusters based on tertiles of education or occupation homogeneity (3 
groups x 28 years). The dependent variable is the dispersion of cumulative 
number of migrants across villages in group measured by the gini coefficient. 
Low homogeneity group is the reference category. Year dummies are included 
in both models.   
 